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Cross-Training with Imperfect Training Schemes
Abstract
Cross-training workers is one of the most efficient ways of achieving flexibility in
manufacturing and service systems for increasing responsiveness to demand variability.
However, it is generally the case that cross-trained employees are not as productive
on a specific task as employees who were originally trained for that task. Also, the
productivity of the cross-trained workers depends on when they are cross-trained. In
this work, we consider a two-stage model to analyze the effects of variations in pro-
ductivity levels on cross-training policies. We define a new metric called achievable
capacity and show that it plays a key role in determining the structure of the problem.
If cross-training can be done in a consistent manner, the achievable capacity is not
affected by when the training is done which implies that the cross-training decisions
are independent of the opportunity cost of lost demand and are based on a trade-off
between cross-training costs at different times. When the productivities of workers
trained at different times differ, there is a three-way trade-off between cross-training
costs at different times and the opportunity cost of lost demand due to lost achievable
capacity. We analyze the effects of variability and show that if the productivity levels
of workers trained at different times are consistent, the decision maker is inclined to
defer the cross-training decisions as the variability of demand or productivity levels in-
creases. However, when the productivities of workers trained at different times differ,
an increase in the variability may make investing more in cross-training earlier more
preferable.
Keywords: cross-training, flexibility, newsvendor networks, productivity factors
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1 Introduction
Designing flexible systems is one of the key strategies to increase responsiveness to variability
in the market without sacrificing efficiency of the system. One way to achieve flexibility in
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a system is to cross-train workers on several processes. Cross-training has been proven to
be highly beneficial in many different business environments, including but not limited to
the semiconductor and automative industries, call centers and healthcare. For example, in
the semiconductor industry, machine operators are often cross-trained to run more than one
type of sophisticated equipment and technicians are often cross-trained to maintain more
than one type of machine. In addition to increasing efficiency, cross-training can help keep
budgets low, increase a company’s ability to pay more to the employees, reduce turnover
rate, and increase quality due to the workers’ ability to react to unexpected changes (see
e.g., Lyons (1992), McCune (1994), Iravani et al. (2007)).
Cross-trained workers can be shifted to work on new tasks when needed, which yields
a more efficient usage of the resources. However, it is generally the case that cross-trained
employees do not perform equally well on a specific task as employees who were originally
trained for that task, i.e., the training schemes may be imperfect. Moreover, the productivity
levels of the cross-trained workers may depend on when the cross-training is done. In this
paper, our main goal is to analyze how these imperfections in training schemes affect cross-
training decisions. To analyze the effect of imperfect schemes and timing of cross-training
decisions, we consider a two-stage model and study the problem in a newsvendor network
setting, introduced by Van Mieghem (1998) and Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002). Similar to
the prior work, the decision maker decides on the number of employees to cross-train, i.e.,
the level of flexibility, before realizing the demand, which we refer to as oﬄine cross-training.
In the prior work, the first stage decisions are structural (design) decisions where the level
of flexibility is fixed and does not change in the future. In practice, the decision maker
may see that additional cross-training is beneficial after the demand is revealed and may
wish to cross-train workers online as the demand is observed. However, the productivities
of the employees who are cross-trained before and after the demand is observed may differ.
If the demand exceeds the capacity even after the online cross-training, the excess demand
is lost and an opportunity cost is incurred. Once the demand is revealed there is a capacity
requirement for each task to fulfill the demand. With a slight abuse of terminology we refer
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to the capacity requirement for each task as the demand for the task.
We first consider the case where online cross-training is not profitable either because
it is too expensive or the workers cannot be cross-trained online effectively. We provide
a newsvendor-type equation which states the necessary and sufficient conditions that the
optimal oﬄine cross-training levels satisfy, and helps us to quantify when it is beneficial
to invest in cross-training. Then we consider what happens if we are able to increase the
effectiveness of training schemes. One possible argument is that as the training schemes
become more effective, it creates an incentive to invest more in oﬄine cross-training to
exploit this positive change. On the other hand, one might also argue that with the increased
effectiveness, the same or even slightly decreased level of cross-trained workers may be enough
to hedge against possible excess demand. We show that both are reasonable outcomes of
increasing the effectiveness and provide a condition to decide which argument is applicable.
We also study how the optimal oﬄine cross-training policies are affected by the demand
variability. If cross-training costs and opportunity cost of lost demand are comparable, we
show that oﬄine cross-training gets less beneficial as variability increases, which is consistent
with the literature.
Our main focus is the analysis of the trade-off between oﬄine and online cross-training
levels in the presence of imperfect training schemes. We define the metric achievable capacity
for a task as the expected maximum demand that can be satisfied from the workforce with
the skills available for this task and all the idle workers from the other task are cross-trained.
Our main conclusion is that achievable capacity plays a key role in determining the structure
of the cross-training problem. Our results can be summarized as follows:
(i) If the oﬄine and online training schemes are consistent, i.e., their productivity factors
are equal, then the achievable capacity does not depend on when the training is done,
and the opportunity cost of lost demand becomes a fixed cost with respect to the cross-
training levels. Hence, the cross-training decisions are independent of the opportunity
cost of lost demand and the decision maker should only consider the trade off between
the online and oﬄine cross-training costs to decide on the cross-training levels. How-
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ever, when the oﬄine and online training schemes are not consistent, especially when
the online cross-training is less effective than oﬄine, then some achievable capacity
is lost if cross-training is postponed. Then, the decision maker needs to consider a
three-way trade off between cross-training costs of oﬄine and online training schemes
and the opportunity cost due to lost achievable capacity.
(ii) When only two tasks are under consideration, the cross-training problem is separable
and the decision maker can set the oﬄine cross-training levels separately for each task.
This implies that the structure of the two task cross-training problem is very similar
to the problem of dual sourcing under random yields where the decision maker aims to
satisfy the demand from two different sources (oﬄine and online cross-training) whose
productivities are random (see e.g. Wang et al. (2010)). The main feature differentiating
the two task cross-training problem is that the capacities of two sources are dependent
through a total capacity constraint.
(iii) When the training schemes are consistent over time, the decision maker postpones
cross-training, i.e., decreases the level of oﬄine cross-training and the total cost in-
creases, as the variability of random parameters increases. This result is consistent
with the postponement literature (e.g. Feitzinger and Lee (1999)). However, when the
productivity factors for oﬄine and online cross-training schemes differ, then this result
can be reversed. In this case, it may be beneficial to invest more in oﬄine cross-training
to increase achievable capacity as demand variability increases, in order to avoid the
possibility of incurring high opportunity cost.
(iv) If the variability of the online productivity factor increases while making sure that
the online cross-training is always profitable, we show that the total cost also increases.
However, if the variability of the online productivity factor increases beyond a threshold
such that for some scenarios online cross-training is not profitable, then the total cost
might actually decrease as the variability of online productivity increases.
(v) We also study how any improvement on training schemes affects cross-training deci-
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sions. We show that if we can improve both training schemes in a way such that
the difference between productivity factors decreases or at least is kept constant, then
the decision maker postpones cross-training. However, if the oﬄine training schemes
are improved more than the online schemes, investing more on oﬄine cross-training is
better as it also increases the achievable capacity.
The opportunity to benefit from flexibility without too much investment has recently
accelerated research in designing efficient flexible systems and we see this work as a part of
this research stream. In their seminal paper, Jordan and Graves (1995) show that almost
all the benefits of a fully flexible system, where all resources can perform all tasks, can be
achieved by using a moderate level of flexibility. Their results demonstrate that using a
special flexibility configuration referred to as “chaining” and under certain assumptions on
demand, it is possible to obtain 98% of the throughput of a fully flexible system using re-
sources that can perform only two different tasks. Using tools from queueing theory, Jordan
et al. (2004) observe that cross-training can adversely affect performance if a poor control
policy is used and demonstrate that a complete chain is robust with respect to the control
policy and parameter uncertainty. In the literature, the ability of companies to achieve flexi-
bility and efficiency while at the same time meeting customer needs is sometimes also refered
as production agility (Gel et al. (2007); Hopp et al. (2004); Hopp and Van Oyen (2004)).
Hopp and Van Oyen (2004) develop a framework for workforce cross-training, provide a com-
prehensive review of the recent literature and suggest some future research directions. Hopp
et al. (2004) and Gel et al. (2007) analyze flexibility decisions for manufacturing systems
operating under CONWIP or WIP-constrained policies and conclude that a cross-trained
worker should perform her original task before helping on other tasks. Pinker and Shumsky
(2000) perform numerical studies to analyze the trade off between efficiency and quality due
to cross-training. Netessine et al. (2002) show how cross-training policies are affected by
demand correlation. Davis et al. (2009) indicate that under high workload imbalances, an
extensive level of cross training is required to significantly improve the overall production
performance. In a service environment, Gnanlet and Wendell (2009) use a two-stage stochas-
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tic programming model to determine optimal resource levels and demonstrate the benefits
of cross-training activities in a health care setting. In their recent papers, Bassamboo et al.
(2012, 2010) define level-k resources to be the resources that are able to process k different
tasks. In Bassamboo et al. (2012), they prove that for symmetric queueing systems one only
need to use dedicated resources and level-2 resources. Similar to our analysis, Bassamboo
et al. (2010) use the newsvendor network framework to prove that in the optimal flexibility
configurations only two adjacent levels of flexibility are needed. Chou et al. (2010) discuss the
effect of production efficiency comparing full flexibility with a chaining structure. Another
paper which is closely related to our work is Chakravarthy and Agnihothri (2005), where they
study the optimum fraction of flexible servers for a two task problem with perfect training
schemes. They point to the fact that cross-trained workers may not be as efficient as dedi-
cated workers. However, they do not provide an analysis of the problem. There have been
several attempts to formulate the problem as a mathematical program (see e.g. Brusco and
Johns (1998), Walsh et al. (2000) and Tanrisever et al. (2012)). In this paper, our primary
focus is on getting managerial insights for aggregate planning of cross-training efforts.
2 A Two-Stage Model for Cross-Training
In this section, our goal is to provide a detailed analysis of the cross-training problem for
two tasks when the cross-training schemes are imperfect. We analyze the problem of cross-
training workers between two tasks, α and γ. We assume that the capacity is measured
in time units and initially there is x0α and x
0
γ units of capacity dedicated to process tasks
α and γ, respectively. The decision maker has to develop an aggregate workforce plan by
cross-training some of the available workers oﬄine before observing the demand d˜α and d˜γ.
Before actual demand is realized, it costs c1α to train one unit of dedicated capacity of γ to
work on task α. The cross-trained workers can still work on their original task γ with full
efficiency. However, they are not as efficient in their new skill α, and their capacity needs to
be adjusted by a productivity factor δ˜1α, where 0 < δ˜
1
α ≤ 1; i.e., if a cross-trained γ-worker
spends one hour working on task α, it is equivalant to δ˜1α hours of an original α-worker.
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The productivity factor, δ˜1α, can also be perceived as an indicator of the effectiveness of the
training program and is assumed to be random. The random parameters, oﬄine and online
productivity factors and the capacity requirements for each task, are revealed after the oﬄine
cross-training decisions are made. After the capacity requirements for tasks are revealed, we
first use the dedicated workers and workers cross-trained oﬄine in the first stage to satisfy
the demand. If the available capacity for task α is not enough to satisfy the requirement
and there is excess capacity for task γ, additional cross-training can be performed online at
a unit cost of c2α. The productivity factor for the workers cross-trained in the second stage
is δ˜2α, where 0 < δ˜
2
α ≤ 1. Unless otherwise stated we assume that δ˜2α ≤ δ˜1α with probability
one (w. p. 1). If the workforce at hand cannot satisfy the capacity requirements even after
the second stage cross-training, the demand is lost incurring a unit opportunity cost of hα.
A similar mechanism works to satisfy the demand for γ interchanging the subscripts.
Without loss of generality, we assume that hα ≤ hγ. When workers are cross-trained to
work on both tasks, a natural question is on which task they are allocated when they are
needed for both. In this paper, we assume the following:
Assumption 2.1. It is always preferable to use cross-trained workers on their original tasks
rather than their new tasks when they are needed for both, i.e., hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ holds w. p. 1.
To simplify our analysis and notation, we also assume that random variables d˜α, d˜γ, δ˜
1 =
(δ˜1α, δ˜
1
γ) and δ˜
2 = (δ˜2α, δ˜
2
γ) are continuous with joint density function f(d˜α, d˜γ, δ˜
1, δ˜2) and use
ξ˜ = (d˜α, d˜γ, δ˜
1, δ˜2), whenever we do not need to address specific random variables. Through-
out this work, a random variable x is denoted x˜, E[x˜] denotes the expected value of the
random variable. Similarly, we use E[x˜; Ω] =
∫
Ω
xdP(x) to denote the expectation over a
scenario region Ω. We present proofs of our propositions given below in Appendix A to
allow for a better readability.
We need to write out the objective function explicitly based on the mechanism described
above. The decision maker initially decides on x1α and x
1
γ, which are the amount of workforce
cross-trained oﬄine to work on α and γ from the dedicated capacity of γ and α, respectively.
We can decompose the cost function g(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) into the first stage cost which is incurred
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Figure 1: Partitioning the support of the demand vector
due to oﬄine cross-training and the second stage cost v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) which is revealed after the
realization of random parameters as
min
x1α,x
1
γ
E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)] = min
x1α,x
1
γ
c1αx
1
α + c
1
γx
1
γ + E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)]. (1)
The second stage cost, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜), depends on whether new cross-training is needed after the
demand is observed. Hence, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) takes different forms depending on the realization
of random parameters. To analyze this function further and calculate the expected value
for given x1α, x
1
γ, we first use the tower property E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)] = E[E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]]. To
calculate the conditional expectation E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2], we first partition the support of
(δ˜1, δ˜2) into subsets, where in each subset the nature of the second stage decision is different.
Then, we partition the support of d˜α and d˜γ so that the function v(x
1
α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) has a single
form within a partition. This partitioning scheme is explained below and the most general
graphical representation is given in Figure 1.
Under Assumption 2.1, task α demand will be lost only when the demand d˜α cannot be
supplied by using the initial capacity x0α and cross-trained workers who are not allocated to
task γ. Since hα ≤ hγ, the same claim is always true for task γ. If we choose to cross-train
workers online in the second stage, we need to spend c2α/δ˜
2
α to satisfy unit demand of task
α, or we lose the demand and incur a cost of hα. Hence, for task α, we choose to resort to
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online cross-training first if c2α ≤ δ˜2αhα and we never cross-train online in the second stage if
c2α > δ˜
2
αhα. Similar logic applies to task γ.
2.1 Case 1: Online cross-training is not profitable
We first consider the situation where losing the excess demand is preferable over online cross-
training in the second stage for both tasks, i.e., c2α > δ˜
2
αhα and c
2
γ > δ˜
2
γhγ w. p. 1. Under
this assumption we can use the following partitioning to explicitly state v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) for any
given x0α, x
0
γ and ξ˜.
1. Ωa1 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : d˜α ≤ x0α, d˜γ ≤ x0γ}. For the scenarios in Ωa1, the initial workforce is
enough to satisfy the capacity requirements. Hence, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = 0 on Ω
a
1.
2. Ωb1 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α < d˜α ≤ min{x0α + δ˜1αx1α, x0α + δ˜1α(x0γ − d˜γ)}, d˜γ ≤ x0γ}. On Ωb1, the
initial workforce x0α cannot satisfy d˜α. Task γ may need to use some workers who are
cross-trained oﬄine to work on α, but the remaining cross-trained workforce is enough
to satisfy the excess demand for α. Hence, again v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = 0 on Ω
b
1.
3. Ωc1 is defined similar to Ω
b
1 with α and γ interchanged, and v(x
1
α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = 0 on Ω
c
1.
We define Ω1 = Ω
a
1∪Ωb1∪Ωc1. When the demand falls in this region, no recourse action
is needed in the second stage and hence no cost is incurred.
4. Ω2 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α + δ˜1αx1α < d˜α, 0 ≤ d˜γ ≤ x0γ − x1α}(= Ωa2 ∪ Ωb2 in Figure 1). The
demand for γ is low so that all the cross-trained workers can be used to work on task α.
However, even this is not enough to satisfy d˜α and the excess demand is lost. Hence,
v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hα(d˜α − x0α − δ˜1αx1α) on Ω2.
5. Ω3 = {(d˜α, d˜γ), x0α + δ˜1α(x0γ − d˜γ) < d˜α, x0γ − x1α < d˜γ ≤ x0γ}. For scenarios in this subset
of the support, some but not all of the workers who are cross-trained to work on task
α can be shifted to α, and this is not enough to satisfy the capacity requirement. The
excess demand is lost and hence, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hα(d˜α − (x0α + δ˜1α(x0γ − d˜γ))) on Ω3.
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6. Ω4 = {(d˜α, d˜γ), x0α − x1γ < d˜α ≤ x0α, x0γ + δ˜1γ(x0α − d˜α) < d˜γ}(= Ωa4 ∪ Ωb4 in Figure 1).
This region is defined in the same way as Ω3 with α and γ interchanged. The second
stage cost function is given by v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hγ(d˜γ − (x0γ + δ˜1γ(x0α − d˜α))).
7. Ω5 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : 0 ≤ d˜α ≤ x0α− x1γ, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ}(= Ωa5 ∪Ωb5 in Figure 1). Ω5 is the analog
of Ω2 with α and γ interchanged. Hence, v(x
1
α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hγ(d˜γ − x0γ − δ˜1γx1γ) on Ω5.
8. Ω6 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α < d˜α, x0γ < d˜γ}(= Ωa6 ∪ Ωb6 in Figure 1). In this case, the initial
capacity is not enough to satisfy the demand for either task. Hence, excess demand is
lost for both tasks. The second stage cost is v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hα(d˜α − x0α) + hγ(d˜γ − x0γ).
After characterizing the cost function completely, we now focus on analyzing the optimal
oﬄine cross-training levels. Our first result states a necessary and sufficient condition that
should be satisfied by the optimal cross-training levels. The sets, Ωis, depend on the cross-
training levels x1α or x
1
γ and to emphasize the dependency we adopt the notation Ωi(x
1
α) or
Ωi(x
1
γ) as appropriate in the equations below.
Proposition 2.1. Any x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that satisfies the equation
E[δ˜1α; Ω2(x1∗α )] =
c1α
hα
, (2)
is an optimal oﬄine cross-training level for α. If there does not exist any x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that
satisfies (2), then either E[δ˜1α; Ω2(x0γ)] ≥
c1α
hα
or E[δ˜1α; Ω2(0)] ≤
c1α
hα
and the optimal oﬄine
cross-training level for α is x1α
∗
= x0γ or x
1
α
∗
= 0, respectively. The same result holds for x1γ
∗
when α and γ are interchanged above.
Condition (2) states that under the optimal cross-training policy, the expectation of
the first-stage productivity factor over the scenarios where the cross-trained workers are
utilized for their new tasks should be equal to the ratio of the first-stage cross-training
and the opportunity costs. An important feature of Proposition 2.1 is that it indicates the
problem is separable, i.e., the optimal cross-training levels for tasks α and γ can be decided
separately. Hence, we only state results relating to task α below and similar results hold for
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γ by interchanging the subscripts. Also, even though Proposition 2.1 assumes continuous
distributions, the results can be extended to a discrete setting using a similar methodology
to the newsvendor problem. An immediate consequence of Proposition 2.1 is as follows.
Corollary 2.1. When the first-stage productivity factor δ˜1α is deterministically equal to δ
1
α,
then any x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that satisfies the newsvendor-type equation
P(x0α + δ1αx1α ≤ d˜α, x0γ − x1α ≥ d˜γ) =
c1α
δ1αhα
(3)
solves the cross-training problem. If there does not exist any x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that satisfies (3),
then, either P(x0α + δ1αx1α ≤ d˜α, x0γ − x1α ≥ d˜γ) ≥
c1α
δ1αhα
or P(x0α + δ1αx1α ≤ d˜α, x0γ − x1α ≥ d˜γ) ≤
c1α
δ1αhα
and the optimal cross-training level for α is x1∗α = x
0
γ or x
1∗
α = 0, respectively.
Proposition 2.1 also helps us understand when it is not profitable to cross-train. This
result is in accordance with the case with perfect cross-training schemes.
Corollary 2.2. It is not profitable to cross-train oﬄine for task α if the assumption of
Proposition 2.1 holds and at least one of E[δ˜1α], P(x0α ≤ d˜α) or P(x0γ ≤ d˜γ) is less than
c1α
hα
.
Intuitively, one should not resort to cross-training if the effectiveness of training programs
is not good enough. The first part of Corollary 2.2 quantifies how “good enough” should be
interpreted. The second part says that before cross-training one should make sure that there
is a solid chance that extra capacity will be needed. Even when extra capacity is needed,
demand for the other task may make it impossible to utilize the cross-trained workers.
2.1.1 Independent Demands and Deterministic Productivity Factors
We now investigate the sensitivity of the oﬄine cross-training levels to the changes in pro-
ductivity factors when the productivity factors are deterministic and demand for different
tasks are independent. If we are able to increase the effectiveness of our training policies, one
may argue that it is better to exploit this further by increasing our oﬄine cross-training level.
On the other hand, another argument is that this increase in effectiveness may significantly
reduce the risk of incurring opportunity cost of lost demand and we may not need to invest
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as much in oﬄine cross-training. Proposition 2.2 provides a condition to decide which of
these arguments is applicable.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that the oﬄine productivity factor δ˜1α is deterministically equal
to δ1α and the demand for α and γ, d˜α and d˜γ are independent. Then, the optimal oﬄine
cross-training level x1α
∗
for task α increases as productivity factor δ1α increases if and only if
Hd˜α(x
0
α + δ
1
αx
1∗
α ) =
fd˜α(x
0
α + δ
1
αx
1∗
α )
P(x0α + δ1αx1∗α ≤ d˜α)
≤ 1
δ1αx
1∗
α
, (4)
where fd˜α(·) and Hd˜α(·) are the marginal probability density and hazard rate functions of task
α demand, d˜α, respectively.
To decide whether it is better to cross-train more than x1∗α , we need to concentrate
on the scenarios where the demand exceeds x0α + δ
1
αx
1∗
α . The definition of the hazard rate
function implies that P(d˜α ≤ x0α + δ1αx1∗α + |d˜α > x0α + δ1αx1∗α ) ≈ Hd˜α(x0α + δ1αx1∗α ). Hence,
if Hd˜α(x
0
α + δ
1
αx
1∗
α ) is high, even when the demand exceeds x
0
α + δ
1
αx
1∗
α , the probability that
it exceeds by a large margin is low, in which case a small increase in the productivity factor
is enough to satisfy the exceeding demand and additional cross-training is not beneficial.
However, if Hd˜α(x
0
α + δ
1
αx
1∗
α ) is low, when the demand exceeds x
0
α + δ
1
αx
1∗
α most probably
it exceeds by a large margin and an increase in the productivity factor makes additional
cross-training more attractive.
Under some mild conditions, we can use Proposition 2.1 to infer how the variability of
the demand for different tasks affects the cross-training decisions.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose d˜1 and d˜2 are symmetric random variables around zero, i.e.,
P(d˜i < −x) = P(d˜i > x) for all values of x and i = 1, 2. If δ˜1α is deterministically equal to
δ1α, 2c
1
α ≥ δα1 hα, the demands for different tasks, d˜α and d˜γ, are independent, continuous and
can be written as d˜α = md˜1 +µ1 and d˜γ = nd˜2 +µ2, then the optimal cross-training level x
1∗
α
is non-increasing in both m and n.
Proposition 2.3 essentially states that if demands for tasks are independent and follow
symmetric distributions, e.g. a normal or uniform distributon, and if the costs and pro-
ductivity factors satisfy the conditions above, the optimal cross-training level for task α is
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decreasing with the variances of demands. Unfortunately, when δ˜1α is not deterministic, the
monotonicity result may not hold. Some counterexamples are presented in Section 3.
2.2 Case 2: Profitable online cross-training in the second stage
Now, we consider the situation where it is profitable to cross-train online in the second stage,
i.e., c2α < δ˜
2
αhα and c
2
γ < δ˜
2
γhγ w. p. 1. The demand is lost only when the available workforce
is not able to satisfy the demand even after all the idle workers are cross-trained online in the
second stage. Hence, for scenarios in Ω1,Ω3,Ω4 and Ω6 the cost function is as in Section 2.1
and we only need to consider Ω2 and Ω5 further.
1. Ωa2 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α + δ˜1αx1α < d˜α ≤ x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ), d˜γ < x0γ − x1α}. If
(d˜α, d˜γ) ∈ Ωa2, both the initial workforce and the cross-trained workforce are used in
performing task α. If (d˜α − x0α − δ˜1αx1α)/δ˜2α units of the workforce are cross-trained to
work on α, the remaining demand can be satisfied. Hence, the second stage cross-
training cost is
v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = c
2
α
d˜α − x0α − δ˜1αx1α
δ˜2α
.
2. Ωb2 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ) < d˜α, d˜γ < x0γ − x1α}. For the scenarios
in Ωb2, it is not possible to satisfy the demand for α even after all the cross-trained
workforce work on task α. The decision maker cross-trains the idle workforce of γ and
then excess demand is lost. Hence, over Ωb2
v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = c
2
α(x
0
γ − x1α − d˜γ) + hα(d˜α − x0α − δ˜1αx1α − δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ)).
Ωa5 and Ω
b
5 are defined similarly interchanging the subscripts.
Now we formally define achievable capacity of a task which plays a major role in deter-
mining the structure of the cross-training problem. For simplicity, we state the definition
specifically for task α.
Definition 2.1. The achievable capacity of task α under first-stage cross-training level x1α,
Cα(x
1
α), is the expected value of the maximum demand for task α that can be satisfied after
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the randomness is realized and all idle workers for task γ are cross-trained, i.e., defining
notation x+ = max{x, 0}, Cα(x1α) = x0α + E[δ˜1α min{x1α, (x0γ − d˜γ)+}+ δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − dγ)+].
When δ˜1α = δ˜
2
α = δ˜ w. p. 1, we get Cα(x
1
α) = x
0
α + E[δ˜(x0γ − dγ)+] and the achievable
capacity is independent of the first-stage cross-training level. However, when P(δ˜1α > δ˜2α) > 0,
the demand that can be satisfied without incuring opportunity cost increases as the first-
stage cross-training increases.
Similar to Proposition 2.1, we now state a necessary and sufficient condition that should
be satisfied by the optimal oﬄine cross-training level. This condition suggests a three-way
trade off between the oﬄine and online cross-training costs and the opportunity cost of lost
demand due to achievable capacity lost by delaying the training.
Proposition 2.4. Any solution x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that satisfies the equation
E[
c2αδ˜
1
α
δ˜2α
; Ωa2(x
1∗
α )] + E[c2α + hα(δ˜1α − δ˜2α); Ωb2(x1∗α )] = c1α (5)
is an optimal cross-training level for α. If there does not exist any x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that satisfies
(5), then, either E[ c
2
αδ˜
1
α
δ˜2α
; Ωa2(x
0
γ)] +E[c2α +hα(δ˜1α− δ˜2α); Ωb2(x0γ)] ≥ c1α or E[ c
2
αδ˜
1
α
δ˜2α
; Ωa2(0)] +E[c2α +
hα(δ˜
1
α − δ˜2α); Ωb2(0)] ≤ c1α and the optimal cross-training level for α is x1∗α = x0γ or x1∗α = 0,
respectively. The same result holds for task γ with α and γ interchanged above.
The opportunity cost plays a role only for the scenarios in Ωb2, i.e., for the scenarios where
the online cross-training is needed. To understand this further, suppose we defer training
one unit of workforce to the second stage. For the scenarios where this additional workforce
is not needed for task α or is needed for task γ, we cannot use this additional workforce
on task α, then the opportunity cost does not depend on whether this workforce is cross-
trained or not oﬄine. If this workforce is not needed for task γ and is needed for task α, we
lose δ˜1α − δ˜2α units of achievable capacity by postponing cross-training from oﬄine to online.
This indicates that the marginal decrease in achievable capacity by cross-training one unit of
workforce online instead of oﬄine is E[(δ˜1α− δ˜2α); Ωb2(x1∗α )]. Proposition 2.4 suggests that only
the opportunity cost for this lost capacity affects our decisions. If the training effectiveness
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in both stages is the same, then essentially we do not lose any achievable capacity and hence
the opportunity cost does not play any role in our decisions. Corollary 2.3 below summarizes
these observations.
Corollary 2.3. If the training effectiveness for programs before and after demand is realized
are the same, i.e., δ˜1α = δ˜
2
α w. p. 1, then optimal cross-training decisions do not depend
on the opportunity cost hα and any solution x
1
α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that satisfies the newsvendor-type
equation
P(d˜α ≥ x0α + δ˜1αx1α∗, d˜γ ≤ x0γ − x1α∗) =
c1α
c2α
(6)
is an optimal cross-training level for α. If there does not exist any x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that satisfies
(6), then, either P(d˜α ≥ x0α + δ˜1αx0γ, d˜γ = 0) ≥
c1α
c2α
or P(d˜α ≥ x0α, d˜γ ≤ x0γ) ≤
c1α
c2α
and the
optimal cross-training level for α is x1∗α = x
0
γ or x
1∗
α = 0, respectively. The same result holds
for task γ with α and γ interchanged above.
2.2.1 Independent Demands and Deterministic Productivity Factors
Another important question is how the oﬄine cross-training depends on the variability in
demand. One might expect that as the variance of demand increases, it should become more
profitable to delay the cross-training. Proposition 2.5 proves that when δ˜1α = δ˜
2
α w. p. 1, and
under mild conditions on training costs and demand distributions, this is indeed true. The
proof of Proposition 2.5 follows the same lines as in Proposition 2.3 and is omitted here.
Proposition 2.5. Suppose d˜1 and d˜2 are symmetric random variables around zero, i.e.,
P(d˜i < −x) = P(d˜i > x) for all values of x and i = 1, 2. If δ˜1α = δ˜2α = δα is deterministically,
2c1α ≥ c2α, the demand for different tasks, d˜α and d˜γ, are independent, continuous and can
be written as d˜α = md˜1 + µ1 and d˜γ = nd˜2 + µ2, then the optimal cross-training level x
1∗
α is
non-increasing in both m and n.
Obviously, Proposition 2.5 also covers the case with perfect training schemes where δ˜1α =
δ˜2α = 1 w. p. 1. However, the situation is quite different when δ˜
1
α 6= δ˜2α. To demonstrate what
may go wrong consider the following counter-example. Suppose that d˜γ = 1 deterministically,
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and P(d˜α = 9) = P(d˜α = 11) = 0.1 and P(d˜α = 10) = 0.8. Also assume that x0α =
10, x0γ = 3, c
1
α = 3, c
2
α = 4 and the unit opportunity cost of lost demand is extremely high as
hα = 10000. The given parameters satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2.5 except suppose
we have δ˜1α = 1 6= δ˜2α = 0.5 w. p. 1. Since there is a small probability that the cross-trained
workers will be needed and it is possible to cross-train necessary workers in the second stage,
it is optimal not to cross-train any workers oﬄine in the first stage, i.e., x1∗α = 0, and if
necessary cross-train two task γ workers online to work on α. Now consider the case where
d˜α follows the distribution with probability mass function P(d˜α = 8) = P(d˜α = 12) = 0.1 and
P(d˜α = 10) = 0.8. If the scenario d˜α = 12 reveals, one γ worker will be working to satisfy γ
demand and even if the remaining two γ workers are cross-trained online their productivity
will be equivalent to one original α worker. Hence, it is not possible to satisfy the demand by
only online cross-training in the second stage . In order not to risk a high opportunity cost
of lost demand, we need to cross-train two workers (x1∗α = 2). In this example, the fact that
the productivity factors for oﬄine and online cross-training are not equal plays the major
role and forces us to invest more in oﬄine cross-training as the variance increases in order
not to lose achievable capacity.
When online cross-training is not profitable, Proposition 2.2 states a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for oﬄine cross-training levels to be increasing as we improve the training
policies for oﬄine cross-training. When online cross-training is profitable, any improve-
ment we make on our training policies increases both oﬄine and online productivity factors.
Proposition 2.6 shows that if the training schemes are improved in such a way that the
difference between oﬄine and online productivity factors stays the same or decreases, then
oﬄine cross-training will be less attractive.
Proposition 2.6. Consider two systems with deterministic productivity factors, (δ¯1α, δ¯
2
α) and
(δˆ1α, δˆ
2
α) such that δ¯
i
α ≤ δˆiα for i = 1, 2 and δ¯1α − δ¯2α ≥ δˆ1α − δˆ2α, and suppose that x¯1∗α and xˆ1∗α
are the optimal oﬄine cross-training levels respectively. Then, x¯1∗α ≥ xˆ1∗α .
The case when δ¯1α − δ¯2α > δˆ1α − δˆ2α implies that if the second stage productivity factor
increases more than the first stage productivity factor, then it is better to postpone the
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cross-training to the second stage by reducing the oﬄine cross-training. Proposition 2.6
concludes that even when both oﬄine and online productivity factors are improved at the
same level, it is better to reduce the oﬄine cross-training. Because in this case, it is possible
to cover more demand by cross-training less and the marginal savings in the opportunity
cost by increasing the oﬄine cross-training is always better when the productivity factors are
low for any given scenario. However, when δ¯1α− δ¯2α < δˆ1α− δˆ2α, one can exploit the increase in
the differences to reduce opportunity cost substantially by increasing oﬄine cross-training.
2.2.2 The Effect of Variability in the Productivity Factors on Optimal Cross-
Training Levels
Now, we investigate how the variability of the productivity factors affects the total cost.
Propositions 2.7 and 2.8 state that the total cost of cross-training policies which is the sum
of costs of oﬄine cross-training, online cross-training and the opportunity cost of lost de-
mand increases as the variability of the first and second stage productivity factor increase,
respectively. Even though we are explicitly assuming that the second stage cross-training
is profitable in this section, an equivalent of Propositon 2.7 can be proved under the as-
sumptions of Section 2.1. However, as there is no second stage cross-training under the
assumptions of Section 2.1, there is no equivalent version of Proposition 2.8.
Proposition 2.7. Suppose hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ w. p. 1, the second stage productivity factor is deter-
ministically equal to δ2α, the first stage productivity factor δ˜
1
α is independent of other param-
eters and can be expressed as δ˜1α = δ
1
α + n∆˜, where ∆˜ is a random variable with mean 0 and
n is chosen such that P(δ˜1α ≤ 1) = 1. Then, the total cost is an increasing function of n.
Now, we analyze how the variability of the second stage productivity factor affects the
total cost of cross-training policies. Proposition 2.8 proves that the total cost is increasing
with respect to the variance of δ˜2α if we make sure that online cross-training is profitable
for all realizations of the productivity factors. The proof follows the same lines as that of
Propositon 2.7.
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Proposition 2.8. Suppose the first stage productivity factor is deterministically equal to δ1α
and hα ≥ δ1γhγ. The second stage productivity factor δ˜2α is independent of other parameters
and can be expressed as δ˜2α = δ
2
α + n∆˜, where ∆˜ is a random variable with mean 0 and n is
chosen such that P(δ˜2α ∈ [c2α/hα, 1]) = 1. Then, the total cost is an increasing function of n.
As the second stage productivity factor only appears in the equations when the on-
line cross-training is profitable, one may be inclined to think that the requirement P(δ˜2α ∈
[c2α/hα, 1]) = 1 does not play much of a role. However, if we cannot ensure that the online
cross-training will be profitable after realizing the parameters, then the total cost might
actually decrease as the variability of the second stage productivity factor increases. To un-
derstand why this is possible consider the following example. To concentrate on the effects
of online cross-training parameters assume that oﬄine cross-training is too expensive and
c1α = 10, c
2
α = 2, hα = 5, x
0
α = 50 and x
0
γ = 80. Also suppose that d˜α = 106, d˜γ = 0 and δ˜
1
α = 1
w. p. 1. The second stage productivity factor is random and P(δ˜2α = 0.3) = P(δ˜2α = 0.7) = 0.5.
If the second stage productivity factor is high, δ˜2α = 0.7, then the entire γ workforce is trained
online to work on α. If δ˜2α = 0.3, then online cross-training is not profitable and all the excess
demand is lost. The expected total cost is 220. However, if P(δ˜2α = 0.2) = P(δ˜2α = 0.8) = 0.5,
then the expected total cost is 210. We see that increasing the variance can be perceived
as increasing the productivity factors above the mean and decreasing the values below the
mean. Pushing the lower values of productivity factors down does not change the achievable
capacity as incuring opportunity cost is preferable in any case. However, pushing the higher
values of productivity factors up increases the achievable capacity and significantly reduces
the second stage cost. Hence, the total cost decreases. Section 3 presents a counterexam-
ple where the oﬄine cross-training is suffficiently cheap and the total cost decreases as the
variability of the second stage productivity factor increases.
3 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we numerically analyze how varying different parameters affects cross-training
policies. The problems for each experiment are designed to highlight the caveats for the
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(a) Cross-training and opportunity costs (b) Total cost
Figure 2: Costs with respect to the variability of demand for α when productivity factor is
random
theory in the previous sections. In the examples, we only concentrate on cross-training costs
for task α and due to separability we do not need to specify cost parameters related to task
γ.
3.1 Effects of Demand Variability on Cross-Training Levels When
Productivity Factors are Random
Proposition 2.3 states that the oﬄine cross-training decreases as the variability in demand
increases when the second stage cross-training is not profitable, the first stage productivity
factors are deterministic and costs satisfy some mild conditions. This is in agreement with
the postponement literature. In this section, we provide an example to show the crucial
role played by the deterministic nature of productivity factors. In this example, we have
(x0α, x
0
γ) = (10, 100), c
1
α = 55, hα = 100, P(δ˜1α = 1) = 0.1 and P(δ˜1α = 0.6) = 0.9 and
P(δ˜2α = 0) = 1. Using the notation in Proposition 2.3, we have the expected value of d˜α
µ1 = 25, d˜1 ∼Uniform(−1, 1), i.e., for any given n > 0, d˜α ∼Uniform(25 − n, 25 + n). To
concentrate on the effects of variability of demand α, we assume d˜γ = 0 w. p. 1.
Figure 2(a) shows that when the first stage productivity factor is random, the optimal
oﬄine cross-training first increases as the variability of demand increases up to a certain
threshold and then decreases. The trend in the optimal opportunity cost is the opposite
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(a) δ = 0.6 (b) δ = 0.8
Figure 3: The effect of productivity factor variability on the optimal cross-training levels
and it increases (decreases) as the optimal oﬄine cross-training level decreases (increases).
However, the variability of demand always has an adverse affect on the total cost, and
regardless of the trend in the other costs, the total cost increases as the variability increases.
For 0 < n < 4, P(x0α + δ˜1αx1∗α < d˜α|δ˜1α = 0.6) = 1 and P(x0α + δ˜1αx1∗α < d˜α|δ˜1α = 1) < 0.5.
Hence, as n increases in this interval the first probability is not affected, but the second
probability increases and one should increase the optimal cross-training level to recover
Equation (2). This behavior is due to not having P(x0α + δ˜1αx1∗α < d˜α|δ˜1α = δ) > 0.5 for all
values of δ.
3.2 The Effect of the Variability of the First Stage Productivity
Factors when Second Stage Cross-Training is Profitable
We now investigate how the variability of the first stage productivity factor affects the oﬄine
cross-training levels. In this example, we take x0α = 0, x
0
γ = 100, c
1
α = 50, c
2
α = 120,hα = 400,
d˜α ∼Uniform(0,100) and d˜γ = 0 w. p. 1. We assume that the first stage productivity factor
for task α is random and P(δ˜1α = δ − 0.01n) = p and P(δ˜1α = δ + 0.01n) = 1− p. The second
stage productivity factor is deterministically equal to 0.6. In our experiments, we vary δ, n
and p and obtain the optimal oﬄine cross-training levels.
Figure 3 shows that when the mean of the first stage productivity factor is equal to the
second stage productivity factor, the oﬄine cross-training levels tend to decrease as the vari-
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ability of the first stage productivity factor increases. However, when the mean of the oﬄine
productivity factor is strictly greater than the second stage productivity factor, the optimal
oﬄine cross-training level may increase as the variability of the first stage productivity factor
increases.
3.3 The Change in Cross-Training Costs as Productivity Improves
Proposition 2.6 shows that if the productivity factors are improved while keeping the differ-
ence between the first and the second stage factors constant, one tends to invest less in oﬄine
cross-training. Now, we perform experiments to understand how the optimal second stage
opportunity and total costs respond to the changes in productivity factors. In this example,
we take x0α = 0, x
0
γ = 100, c
1
α = 50, c
2
α = 70, h = 200, d˜α ∼Uniform(0,100) and d˜γ = 0 w. p.
1. We also assume that the productivity factors are deterministic and satisfy δ2α = δ
1
α −∆,
and perform experiments by changing δ1α and ∆.
Figure 4(a) confirms the result of Proposition 2.6 and Figures 4(c) and 4(d) are in accor-
dance with our expectations as both opportunity and total costs decrease as the productivity
factors improve. Figure 4(b) is interesting and shows that if the difference between produc-
tivity factors is relatively small, the second stage cross-training cost first increases and then
decreases. However, when the difference between the productivity factors is relatively large,
the second stage cost increases as the productivity factors are improved.
3.4 Capacity Constraints on Online Cross-Training
Our model assumes that all the capacity can be cross-trained if needed. In many real
world situations, the resources are limited and it is very difficult to cross-train workers after
the demand is revealed and when the workers are already trying to satisfy the observed
demand. This might impose a capacity on the number of workers that can be cross-trained
online. In this section, we investigate how such a capacity constraint affects the optimal
cross-training levels and related costs. We take x0α = 0, x
0
γ = 100, c
1
α = 50, c
2
α = 70, h =
200, d˜α ∼Uniform(0,100) and d˜γ = 0, δ˜1α = 0.9, δ˜2γ = 0.7 w. p. 1. We denote the online
cross-training capacity as Kα.
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(a) First stage cost (b) Second stage cost
(c) Opportunity cost (d) Total cost
Figure 4: The sensitivity of various costs to changes in productivity factors
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(a) First stage cost (b) Second stage cost
(c) Opportunity cost (d) Total cost
Figure 5: The sensitivity of various costs to online cross-training capacity
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Figure 6: The sum of optimal cross-training and online cross-training capacity vs. online
cross-training capacity.
Figure 5 shows that the optimal oﬄine cross-training cost first decreases slowly up to a
certain point and then decreases rapidly and after a certain threshold it stays constant. The
behavior of the expected online cross-training cost is exactly the opposite. More interestingly,
we see that the opportunity cost decreases as the oﬄine cross-training cost decreases slowly
and then increases as the oﬄine cross-training cost decreases rapidly. We also see that the
total cost is a convex function of the online cross-training capacity.
To understand this behavior, we plot the sum of optimal oﬄine cross-training and online
cross-training capacity versus the online cross-training capacity in Figure 6. We see that the
oﬄine cross-training cost decreases slowly when the sum is less than, x0γ, the total number
of workers that can be cross-trained. When this is the case, increasing the capacity yields a
reduction in the opportunity cost. As the online cross-training capacity is increased we reach
a situation where the sum under consideration is equal to x0γ and the optimal oﬄine cross-
training level is still greater than the optimal level without the capacity constraint. When
this is the case, an increase in the online cross-training capacity constraint will be exactly
equal to the decrease in the optimal oﬄine cross-training level, which implies a decrease
in the achievable capacity and hence, the opportunity cost increases. When the optimal
oﬄine cross-training level hits the optimal level without capacity constraints, the capacity
constraint does not have any effect on costs as all the remaining workers can be cross-trained
online as needed.
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this work, we have studied the effects of imperfect training schemes on the cross-training
policies. We have considered a two-stage model, where the workers can be cross-trained
oﬄine in the first stage, before the demand is realized, and online in the second stage as the
demand is revealed. The cross-trained workers are assumed to be less productive than the
workers who are originally trained to do a specific task and the productivity of the cross-
trained workers may depend on when they are cross-trained (oﬄine or online). We have
defined the achievable capacity as the maximum demand that can be satisfied from a task
after all random parameters are realized and all the idle workers from the other task are
cross-trained. We have shown that when the first stage and second stage training schemes
are equally effective, the achievable capacity does not depend on when the training is done
and the cross-training decisions are independent of the opportunity cost of lost demand.
However when the oﬄine and online training policies differ in their effectiveness, deferring
cross-training implies a significant decrease in the achievable capacity and hence, the decision
maker needs to consider a three-way trade off between cross-training costs of oﬄine and online
schemes and opportunity cost of lost demand.
We have also analyzed how the variability of demand and productivity factors affect
our cross-training decisions. We have shown under some mild conditions that when the
productivity levels of workers trained at different times are consistent, we tend to postopone
cross-training as the demand or productivity factors become more variable. However, when
the workers cross-trained online are less productive, we show via counter-examples that we
may wish to increase increase oﬄine cross-training as variability increases to avoid losing
precious achievable capacity.
The insights provided in this paper can be used to devise effective solution methods to
address the case with more than three tasks. When there are three or more tasks, the cross-
training problem is no longer separable and the analysis and solution methodology need to
be modified. We have also developed a two-stage stochastic integer program to aid decision
makers to design cross-training policies in the presence of multiple tasks. We do not present
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this model in this paper to keep the focus on managerial insights. The integer programming
model is available from the authors upon request.
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A Proofs of Propositions in Section 2
A.1 Proof of Proposion 2.1
Proof. We derive the first order optimality conditions by setting the derivatives equal to 0.
Since the bounds on productivity factors δ˜1 and δ˜2 do not depend on the decision variables,
using Leibniz rule
∂E[E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]]
∂x1α
= E
[
∂E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
]
= c1α+E
[
6∑
i=1
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ωi|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
]
.
The second stage cost function v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) is constant with respect to x
1
α on Ω4,Ω5 and Ω6
and the bounds of these regions do not depend on x1α. Also on Ω1, the second stage cost is
uniformly equal to 0. Hence, the derivatives of expectation over these regions are all equal
to 0. To simplify the notation, we use f(d˜α, d˜γ) to denote the density function of demand
vector when productivity factors are given. The derivative of expectation over Ω2 is
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ω2|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
= −hαδ˜1α
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα
−
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
hα(dα − x0α − δ˜1αx1α)f(dα, x0γ − x1α)ddα
Similarly, we can calculate the derivative of expectation over Ω3
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ω3|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
=
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
hα(dα − x0α − δ˜1αx1α)f(dα, x0γ − x1α)ddα
Canceling the boundary terms, we get
∂E[E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]]
∂x1α
= c1α − hαE[δ˜1α;x0α + δ˜1αx1α ≤ dα, x0γ − x1α > dγ]. (7)
26
The partial derivative with respect to x1γ can be found similarly. Setting these terms to
equal 0, we get equation (2). Now, we need to show that the (x1α, x
1
γ) pairs that solve these
equations, actually minimizes the expected cost by showing that expected cost function is
convex in decision variables. Equation (7) suggests that the cross-partials are 0 and the
Hessian matrix is positive semidefinite if the second partial derivatives with respect to x1α
and x1γ are both nonnegative.
∂2E[E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]]
(∂x1α)
2
= −hα
∂E[δ˜1α
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα]
∂x1α
.
Observe that if x1α < x¯
1
α, then
{(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α+ δ˜1αx¯1α < d˜α, 0 ≤ d˜γ ≤ x0γ−x¯1α} ⊆ {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α+ δ˜1αx1α < d˜α, 0 ≤ d˜γ ≤ x0γ−x1α}.
Using this relation and the fact that the density function and the productivity factor δ˜1α are
always positive, we get
lim
∆→0
E[δ˜0α(
∫∞
x0α+δ˜
1
α(x
1
α+∆)
∫ x0γ−(x1α+∆)
0
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα −
∫∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα)]
∆
≤ 0.
Plugging this back into the second derivative and repeating the same procedure for x1γ, we
conclude that the Hessian is positive semidefinite and the expected cost function is convex.
This also implies that if there is no solution satisfying 2 in [0, x0γ] the optimal solution is
either 0 or x0γ as suggested in cases 2 and 3.
Since the distribution is assumed to be continuous, the derivative in (7) is continuous
in x1α. If the expectation takes both negative and positive values over x
1
α ∈ [0, x0γ], then
intermediate value theorem ensures us that (2) will be satisfied for some x1∗α . Hence, the
three cases stated in the proposition cover all possible situations.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2.2
Proof. Using the fact that δ˜1α ≥ 0 w. p. 1, we get
E[δ˜1α;x0α + δ˜1αx1α
∗ ≤ d˜α, x0γ − x1α∗ > d˜γ] ≤ E[δ˜1α] ≤
c1α
hα
.
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Using the third part of Proposition 2.1 the result follows. To prove the second and third
parts of the corollary, we use the same methodology realizing δ˜1α ≤ 1 w. p. 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. The optimal oﬄine cross-training level x1∗α is a function of δ
1
α. Taking the implicit
derivative of (2) with respect to δ1α, we get
0 = P(x0α + δ1αx1∗α ≤ d˜α)P(x0γ − x1∗α > d˜γ) + δ1α
∂P(x0γ − x1∗α > d˜γ)
∂δ1α
P(x0γ − x1∗α > d˜γ)
+δ1αP(x0α + δ1αx1∗α ≤ d˜α)
∂P(x0γ − x1∗α > d˜γ)
∂δ1α
= P(x0γ − x1∗α > d˜γ)
(
P(x0α + δ1αx1∗α ≤ d˜α)− δ1αfd˜α(x0α + δ1αx1∗α )x1∗α
)
−δ1α
∂x1∗α
∂δ1α
(
P(x0γ − x1∗α > d˜γ)δ1αfd˜α(x0α + δ1αx1∗α ) + P(x0α + δ1αx1∗α ≤ d˜α)fd˜γ (x0γ − x1∗α )
)
,
which implies that ∂x
1∗
α
∂δ1α
≥ 0 if and only if P(x0α + δ1αx1∗α ≤ d˜α) ≥ δ1αfd˜α(x0α + δ1αx1∗α )x1∗α .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. Using equation (3) and independence, we get
P
(
x0α + δ
1
αx
1
α
∗ − µ1
m
≤ d˜1
)
P
(
x0γ − x1α∗ − µ2
n
> d˜2
)
=
c1α
δα1 hα
≥ 1
2
.
Now, we can infer that the probabilities on the left-hand side of the inequality should be
greater than 0.5. Then, using the fact that d˜1 and d˜2 are symmetric random variables
x0α + δ
1
αx
1
α
∗ − µ1
m
≤ 0 and x
0
γ − x1α∗ − µ2
n
≥ 0. (8)
The left-hand side of equation (3) decreases as m increases. Hence, if statement 1 of Corol-
lary 2.1 is true, we need to decrease x1∗α to recover the equality. If statement 2 is true, we
may either wish to stay at x0γ or we may wish to decrease x
1
α. For the third statement, we
do not need to take any action. Hence, this proves that the optimal cross-training level is
non-increasing in m. Similar arguments show that x1∗α is non-increasing in n.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.1 we need to derive the first and second or-
der optimality conditions. On regions Ω1,Ω3,Ω4 and Ω6, the structure is the same as in
Proposition 2.1 and the problem is separable in cross-training levels x1α and x
1
γ.
The derivative of the second-stage cost function over Ωa2 and Ω
b
2can be calculated as:
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ωa2|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
= −
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
∫ x0α+δ˜1αx1α+δ˜2α(x0γ−x1α−d˜γ)
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
c2αδ˜
1
α
δ˜2α
f(d˜α, d˜γ)dd˜αdd˜γ
+
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
(δ˜1α − δ˜2α)c2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ)f(x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ), d˜γ)dd˜γ,
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ωb2|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
= −
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α+δ˜
2
α(x
0
γ−x1α−d˜γ)
(c2α + hα(δ˜
1
α − δ˜2α))f(d˜α, d˜γ)dd˜αdd˜γ
−
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
(δ˜1α − δ˜2α)c2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ)f(x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ), d˜γ)dd˜γ
−
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
hα(d˜α − (x0α + δ˜1αx1α))f(d˜α, x0γ − x1α)dd˜α.
Aggregating all the results and cancelling the boundary terms as appropriate, we obtain
∂E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
= c1α −
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
∫ x0α+δ˜1αx1α+δ˜2α(x0γ−x1α−d˜γ)
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
c2αδ˜
1
α
δ˜2α
f(d˜α, d˜γ)dd˜αdd˜γ
−
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α+δ˜
2
α(x
0
γ−x1α−d˜γ)
(c2α + hα(δ˜
1
α − δ˜2α))f(d˜α, d˜γ)dd˜αdd˜γ.
(9)
Setting these terms to equal 0, we get equation (5). Now, we need to show that the
(x1α, x
1
γ) pairs that solve these equations are optimal by checking the Hessian matrix. We
do not need to consider the cross-partials and the Hessian matrix is positive semidefinite if
the second partial derivatives with respect to x1α and x
1
γ are both nonnegative. We take the
second derivative with respect to x1α and get
∂2E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]
(∂x1α)
2
=
c2α(δ˜
1
α)
2
δ˜2α
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
f(x0α + δ˜
1
αx
1
α, d˜γ)dd˜γ
−(δ˜1α − δ˜2α)
(
c2αδ˜
1
α
δ˜2α
− c2α − hα(δ˜1α − δ˜2α)
)∫ x0γ−x1α
0
f(x0α − δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ), d˜γ)dd˜γ
+
(
c2α + hα(δ˜
1
α − δ˜2α)
) ∫∞
x0α+δ˜
1x1α
f(d˜α, x
0
γ − x1α)dd˜α.
On the right-hand side, the first term is positive and the assumption δ˜1α > δ˜
2
α ensures that the
third term is positive w. p. 1. The positivity of the second term follows from both δ˜1α > δ˜
2
α
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and c2α < δ˜
2
αhα. Hence the objective function is convex and the solution which satisfies (9)
minimizes the total cost.
When the expectation satisfies the inequality for the second case, the derivative of the
cost function is negative for any value in [0, x0γ]. Hence, to minimize the cost, we need to set
x1∗α to the maximum possible value. The third case can be proven similarly.
A.6 Proof of Propositon 2.6
Proof. First to simplify the notation we define
P¯1(y) = P(x0α + δ¯1αy ≤ d˜α ≤ x0α + δ¯1αy + δ¯2α(x0γ − y − d˜γ), d˜γ ≤ x0γ − y),
P¯2(y) = P(d˜α > x0α + δ¯1αy + δ¯2α(x0γ − y − d˜γ), d˜γ ≤ x0γ − y)
P¯ (y) = P¯1(y) + P¯2(y) = P(x0α + δ¯1αy ≤ d˜α, d˜γ ≤ x0γ − y),
C¯(y) =
c2αδ¯
1
α
δ¯2α
P¯1(y) + (c
2
α + hα(δ¯
1
α − δ¯2α))P¯2(y).
Similarly, define Pˆ1(y), Pˆ2(y), Pˆ (y) and Cˆ(y) by interchanging δ¯ with δˆ. First we prove that
C¯(y) and Cˆ(y) are non-increasing functions of y. Let y1 < y2 and define ∆1 = P(Ωa2(y1) \
Ωa2(y2)) and ∆2 = P(Ωa2(y2) \ Ωa2(y1)) where “\” is the set difference operator. Then,
C¯(y2)− C¯(y1) = c
2
αδ¯
1
α
δ¯2α
(∆2 −∆1)− (c2α + hα(δ¯1α − δ¯2α))∆2 ≤
(
(c2α − hαδ¯2α)(δ¯1α − δ¯2α)
δ¯2α
)
∆2 ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that online cross-training is preferable
over incurring opportunity cost.
The condition δ¯1α − δ¯2α ≥ δˆ1α − δˆ2α implies that δ¯1α/δ¯2α ≥ δˆ1α/δˆ2α, and c2α < δ¯2hα implies that
c2αδ¯
1
α/δ¯
2
α < c
2
α + hα(δ¯
1
α − δ¯2α). Then, Equation (9) indicates
Cˆ(x¯1∗α )− c1α = Cˆ(x¯1∗α )− C¯(x¯1∗α )
≤ c
2
αδ¯
1
α
δ¯2α
(Pˆ1(x¯
1∗
α )− P¯1(x¯1∗α )) + (c2α + hα(δ¯1α − δ¯2α))(Pˆ2(x¯1∗α ))− P¯2(x¯1∗α )))
≤ (c2α + hα(δ¯1α − δ¯2α))(Pˆ (x¯1∗α )− P¯ (x¯1∗α )) ≤ 0
Then, xˆ1∗α ≤ x¯1∗α follows as Cˆ(y) is non-increasing.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Proof. As the problem is separable, the cost related to the demand for task γ is a constant
with respect to δ˜1α and for ease of notation we denote it as C. If online cross-training is not
profitable , c2α > hαδ
2
α, we can write the second stage cost function as follows:
v(x1, ξ) = hα max{0, d˜α − x0α − δ˜1αx1α, d˜1α − x0α − δ˜1α(x0γ − d˜γ)}+ C.
Similarly, if online cross-training is profitable, c2α ≤ hαδ2α,
v(x1, ξ) = max
{
0, c2α
dα − x0α − δ1αx1α
δ2α
,
c2α(x
0
γ − x1α − dγ) + hα(dα − xα − δ1αx1α − δ2α(x0γ − x1α − dγ))
}
+ C.
Both functions are convex with respect to δ1α. Then, the function v(x
1, n) = E(v(x1, d, δ1α +
n∆, δ2α)) is convex with respect to n. Then, using Jensen’s inequality for any n > 0 v(x
1, n) ≥
v(x1, 0). If 0 < n1 < n2, then using convexity
v(x1, n1) ≤ n2 − n1
n2
v(x1, 0) +
n1
n2
v(x1, n2) ≤ n2 − n1
n2
v(x1, n1) +
n1
n2
v(x1, n2).
Manipulating, these equations we conclude that v(x1, n2) ≥ v(x1, n1) for any x1. Let x1∗ and
x1∗∗ be the optimal oﬄine cross-training levels for n1 and n2 respectively. Then,
v(x1∗, n1) ≤ v(x1∗∗, n1) ≤ v(x1∗∗, n2)
which concludes the proof.
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